Materiality is an essential element of any claim of deception under the federal securities laws, including an assertion of unlawful insider trading. This article addresses one dimension of materiality in the context of insider trading-the extent to which it is lawful to privately disclose a nonpublic fact that is not material in and of itself, when that fact is then combined with other facts known to the recipient of the disclosure to complete a material mosaic. The mosaic theory has often been written about, as the citations in this article demonstrate, but has never been applied in a reported case and the contours are uncertain. This presents the question whether the theory is an academic illusion or whether the theory offers meaningful protection for the analyst or investor who aggressively probes here and there for nuggets of information that ultimately create a significant aggregate.
THE MOSAIC THEORY OF MATERIALITY -DOES THE ILLUSION HAVE A FUTURE?
by Allan Horwich* Materiality is an essential element of any claim of deception under the federal securities laws, including an assertion of unlawful insider trading. This article addresses one dimension of materiality in the context of insider trading-the extent to which it is lawful to privately disclose a nonpublic fact that is not material in and of itself, when that fact is then combined with other facts known to the recipient of the disclosure to complete a material mosaic. The mosaic theory has often been written about, as the citations in this article demonstrate, but has never been applied in a reported case and the contours are uncertain. This presents the question whether the theory is an academic illusion or whether the theory offers meaningful protection for the analyst or investor who aggressively probes here and there for nuggets of information that ultimately create a significant aggregate.
This article begins with a summary of the concept of materiality, followed by an overview of the classical theory of insider trading, including tipper and tippee liability. After a summary of the SEC's expression of the mosaic theory of materiality, the article then turns to a discussion of the limited case law and scholarly commentary that pertain to that theory. The article then analyzes how the mosaic theory should be applied in the context of a claim that the person who provided the last piece of the puzzle has crossed the line and the person who received the information and assembled that mosaic engaged in unlawful insider trading.
While the pronouncements of the demise of the mosaic theory are very much exaggerated, the practical ability to employ the theory in any given case is limited. Securities professionals, for example, who intend to rely on the theory as they assemble information from multiple sources, including insiders, act at their peril.
I. MATERIALITY UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS
In an action under Rule 10b-5 1 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) a fact is material if "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder 1 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (2013) . The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. This rule is the basis for most private securities litigation and a substantial portion of SEC enforcement activity. DONNA M. NAGY, ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 6-7, 23-24 (3d ed. 2012 ).
In a typical § 10(b) private action a plaintiff must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U. S. 148, 157 (2008) . Reliance and loss causation need not be established in an SEC enforcement proceeding or criminal prosecution for a violation of Rule 10b-5. NAGY, id. at 149.
Potential liability extends beyond the insider who learns the information in the course of his relationship with the company. The insider who discloses nonpublic information to an outsider may be a tipper and the recipient of the information is a tippee, each violating Rule 10b-5.
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach. . . .
. . . .
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty [to keep the information confidential]. All
The other principal theory of insider trading is the misappropriation theory.
The "misappropriation theory" holds that a person commits fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. . . . In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (citation omitted).
There is a third approach, which depends on a direct act of affirmative deception. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 547 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009 ) (sustaining theory of Rule 10b-5 liability where, even absent any fiduciary duty to the source of the information, the defendant engages in deception in order to obtain material nonpublic information, after which the defendant trades). disclosures of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders. . . . Whether disclosure is a breach of duty . . . depends in large part on the purpose of the disclosure. . . . [T] he test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach. 6 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed the necessary element of scienter-intent to deceive-in determining whether a tipper has violated Rule 10b-5:
First, the tipper must tip deliberately or recklessly, not through negligence. Second, the tipper must know that the information that is the subject of the tip is non-public and is material for securities trading purposes, or act with reckless disregard of the nature of the information. Third, the tipper must know (or be reckless in not knowing) that to disseminate the information would violate a fiduciary duty. While the tipper need not have specific knowledge of the legal nature of a breach of fiduciary duty, he must understand that tipping the information would be violating a confidence.
Personal benefit to the tipper is broadly defined: it includes not only "pecuniary gain," such as a cut of the take or a gratuity from the tippee, but also a "reputational benefit" or the benefit one would obtain from simply "mak[ing] a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend." SEC v. Obus, 693 F.2d 276, 285 (2d Cir. 2012 ) (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64).
7 Obus, 693 F.2d at 286. The court elaborated on the multiple elements of scienter for the tipper:
[T]he first and second aspects of scienter-a deliberate tip with knowledge that the information is material and non-public-can often be deduced from the same facts that establish the tipper acted for personal benefit. The inference of scienter is strong because the tipper could not reasonably expect to benefit unless he deliberately tipped material non-public information that the tippee could use to an advantage in trading. The third aspect of scienter, that the tipper acted with knowledge that he was violating a confidence, will often be established through circumstantial evidence.
Id. at 286-87 (citations omitted).
Most important for present purposes is that the tipper must know that the information he tipped was material.
An essential element of tippee liability is that the tippee also know that the tipped information is material and nonpublic. 8 In addition, an element of the violation is that the tippee knew or should have known that confidential information was initially obtained and transmitted improperly by a tipper. 9 This is a fact-specific inquiry turning on the tippee's own knowledge and sophistication, and on whether the tipper's conduct raised red flags that confidential information was being transmitted improperly.
10
In actions against tippees based on the classical theory of insider trading, there is sometimes a dispute about whether the defendant was aware of material nonpublic information. [E]ven if you believe that a defendant was in possession of material nonpublic information, if you also believe the defendant would have made the exact same trade whether or not he possessed material nonpublic information, then you may infer that the defendant did not trade on the basis of material nonpublic information Further consideration of that issue is not pertinent to the question addressed in this article, where it is assumed that the tippee-trader consciously relied on all information known to him when he engaged in the challenged trade.
III. THE MOSAIC THEORY OF MATERIALITY
The mosaic theory of materiality addresses the situation where a tipper tells a tippee some nonpublic information that is not material in and of itself but which, when combined with public information, or with nonpublic information lawfully obtained by the tippee from another source, forms a mosaic of information that gives the tippee a material informational advantage in trading.
14 The insider trading questions that arise are whether the person who provided that immaterial nonpublic information and the recipient who traded have violated Rule 10b-5.
The SEC addressed the mosaic theory when it adopted Regulation FD. 15 In essence, that regulation prohibits some selective disclosure of material nonpublic information by public 14 For ease of discussion, the terms "tipper" and "tippee" will sometimes be used here both where the disclosure violates Rule 10b-5 and where it does not.
This mosaic theory of materiality is not the same as the mosaic theory of misrepresentation under the securities laws. Under the latter, where the defendants are alleged to have made material misrepresentations to the public [the allegedly misleading] public statements must be viewed as part of a "mosaic" to see if those statements, in the aggregate, created a misleading impression. Contrary to defendants' contention, the proper test is not the literal truth or the materiality of each positive statement, but the overall misleading impression that it combines to create.
In re Genentech, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. C-88-4038-DLJ, 1989 WL 106834, at *3 (N.D.Cal. July 7, 1989 disclosure of material nonpublic information to someone among the specified categories of persons, the company must make simultaneous public disclosure; if there is a "non-intentional" covered selective material disclosure there must then be "prompt" public disclosure.
18
In explaining the scope of the disclosure requirement imposed by Regulation FD, the SEC stated that an issuer is not prohibited from disclosing a non-material piece of information to an analyst, even if, unbeknownst to the issuer, that piece helps the analyst complete a "mosaic" of information that, taken together, is material. Similarly, since materiality is an objective test keyed to the reasonable investor, Regulation FD will not be implicated where an issuer discloses immaterial information whose significance is discerned by the analyst.
19
There are several potential limitations on the implications of this commentary for Rule 10b-5. First, Regulation FD addresses only when an issuer is obligated to make a public disclosure of previously undisclosed material information. Mosaic Theory. A financial analyst gathers and interprets large quantities of information from many sources. The analyst may use significant conclusions derived from the analysis of public and nonmaterial nonpublic information as the As with the statement in the Adopting Release, the C&DI refers only to Regulation FD.
Nevertheless, the italicized language in the preceding quotation has unmistakable relevance to Court on other grounds, the Commission noted that this is not a case in which a skilled analyst weaves together a series of publicly available facts and non-material inside disclosures to form a "mosaic" which is only material after the bits and pieces are assembled into one picture. We have long recognized that an analyst may utilize non-public, inside information which in itself is immaterial in order to fill in "interstices in analysis." [citing Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 646 (1971) ] That process is legitimate even though such "tidbits" of inside information "may assume heightened significance when woven by the skilled analyst into the matrix of knowledge obtained elsewhere," thereby creating material information. [citing S.E.C. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1977 
The judicial decision cited by the SEC in its opinion in Dirks was an appellate decision that affirmed a judgment adverse to the Commission. In that opinion the court summarized the SEC's position as a litigant there: basis for investment recommendations and decisions even if those conclusions would have been material inside information had they been communicated directly to the analyst by a company. Under the "mosaic theory," financial analysts are free to act on this collection, or mosaic, of information without risking violation.
The SEC, of course, does not maintain that the securities laws prohibit all disclosures of internal corporate information. The Commission itself has recognized that corporate management may reveal to securities analysts or other inquirers non-public information that merely fills "interstices in analysis," or tests "the meaning of public information." Only when the inside information so "leaked" is essentially "extraordinary in nature" and "reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security" if it is publicly disclosed does a duty arise to make the information generally available.
27
Of course, facts may be material even when they are not "extraordinary in nature" or "reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security." 28 See supra text accompanying notes 3-4 (stating the meaning of "material" under the securities laws). The Managing Director told Moore that he was working on something interesting and active; he rebuffed Moore's offer of help and did not disclose the parties to the proposed transaction.
35
Moore learned that the Managing Director was travelling to London. 36 The SEC alleged that during a charity event in June 2010
Moore observed a chance encounter between the CPPIB Managing Director and the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of Tomkins. However, the CPPIB Managing Director declined to introduce Moore to the CEO or to reveal his identity. Later that day another CIBC employee attending the event volunteered the CEO's identity to Moore. Those events, coupled with other information that he had learned in the course of his efforts to get CIBC a role in the CPPIB Managing The SEC alleged that Moore had "knowingly or recklessly misappropriated from his employer" information that "he knew, or was reckless in not knowing, was material, non-public, and had been acquired in the course of his employment." 41 Because the case was settled when it 37 Id. at ¶ 20.
38 Id. at ¶ 24. Nothing in the complaint identifies the source of this updated information about the CPPIB deal, as it was Moore who stated a big deal was in the works; this information is not explicitly attributed to Moore's CIBC colleague. Presumably had the case been tried the SEC would have argued that the jury could infer from the sequence of events that Moore obtained the information from a CIBC colleague who had in turn obtained the information from CPPIB and thus misappropriated confidential information provided to CIBC in connection with its off-andon relationship with CPPIB.
39 Id. at ¶ ¶ 25-28. 40 Id. at ¶ 29.
41 Id. at ¶ 31.
was filed, the defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the claim. 42 The complaint does not, however, allege that any specific fact learned or observed by Moore was material in and of itself; the first use of the word "material" appears in the concluding paragraphs of the complaint, which state that Moore misappropriated material nonpublic information.
Here is a summary of what the SEC alleged that Moore knew:
• The Managing Director of CPPIB was working on a significant transaction. This fact arguably was disclosed to Moore in Moore's role as a CIBC banker.
(Notably, however, though CIBC sought to work on the deal in question it never did.) This information was, it appears, nonpublic.
• The Managing Director had travelled to London. Presumably this information was public, or at least no effort was made to conceal this activity.
• Moore saw the Managing Director socially, in public, with the CEO of Tomkins; the Managing Director declined to introduce Moore to him or to identify himperhaps signaling a concern about being tied to him in Moore's eyes given what the Managing Director knew that Moore knew about the Managing Director's current pre-occupation-and then Moore independently learned the companion's identity.
None of these facts appear to have been material standing alone; Canadian authorities agree. [having] reached this conclusion as a result of his previous knowledge of Tomkins obtained from public sources including rumours that it would be the reticence to identify someone-whose identity was a matter of public record-with the awareness that CPPIB had something big in the works did produce an arguably marginal material mosaic to the effect that the something big at CPPIB might involve Tomkins, publicly rumored to be a takeover target.
Some commentators have written that the SEC's case against Moore reflects the abandonment of the mosaic theory. 44 As discussed in this article, and by the SEC from time to subject of a takeover, his observations of a friend and senior representative of CPPIB ("Mr. A.") and comments of a general nature made by Mr. A. about work that he was involved in for CPPIB. These interactions with Mr. A. occurred over the course of several months, including on social occasions.
Id. at ¶ ¶ 7-8. The Ontario Commission staff concluded:
Moore's conduct involving the purchase of securities of Tomkins as outlined above fell below the standard of behaviour expected from someone in Moore's position and given his extensive experience in the capital markets industry. In particular, he ought not to have made use of information obtained in part by virtue of his position as an employee of a registrant prior to its general disclosure to the public.
Id. at ¶ 23. 44 As one commentary expressed it, "[T]he SEC's aggressive stance against Moore suggests that, if disparate pieces of information-even if nonpublic and immaterial-are gathered in breach of a duty, then the mosaic theory may not be available as an affirmative defense to insider trading." Morrison & Foerster, INSIDER TRADING ANNUAL REVIEW 2013 , at 8 (Jan. 2014 , available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/140108-Insider-Trading-Annual-Review.pdf. Two other observers have stated:
The Moore case illustrates the limits of the "mosaic theory." Under the mosaic theory investors can assemble many different pieces of information, which may include both publically available information and immaterial non-public information that may be confidential, into a mosaic that provides the investor with a material insight into a security that is not known to the market in general. The Moore case suggests that if all of the immaterial, non-public information in a mosaic was obtained as a result of a breach of duty, then the "mosaic theory" may not be available as a defense to insider trading. 2013%20Rosensaft%20Final .pdf ("This complaint seems to invite a mosaic theory defensethat even if the information gleaned through Moore's employer were insider information, it was only pairing it with the public information at the charity event that made it material. However, the SEC seems unconcerned."); Linklaters, Financial Crime Update 4 (May 2013), http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/mkt/london/Financial_Crime_Update_May_2013.pdf (stating that the Moore complaint "highlights . . . the expanding definition of materiality and the decline of the mosaic theory safe haven"). 45 See infra text accompanying notes 108-110. 46 See supra note 5 (describing misappropriation theory).
IV. THE MOSAIC THEORY IN THE COURTS
Very few cases have addressed the mosaic concept in so many words. 48 Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc. addressed the extent to which disclosure of nonpublic information provided by the chief financial officer of the company to a security analyst was an unlawful tip of material nonpublic information. 49 The court introduced the concept of a mosaic:
A skilled analyst with knowledge of the company and the industry may piece seemingly inconsequential data together with public information into a mosaic which reveals material non-public information. Whenever managers and analysts meet elsewhere than in public, there is a risk that the analysts will emerge with knowledge of material information which is not publicly available.
50
The court emphasized that in order for there to have been a Rule 10b-5 violation "the tipped information must be material."
51
The court then addressed two instances of disclosure by the issuer to a securities analyst.
The first disclosures-that sales in some operations were slipping and that the company was going to make a preliminary announcement of quarterly earnings-were found not to be material. 52 Though not discussing the mosaic concept in this context, the court found that the 48 The research for this article sought to identify cases expressly referring to a "mosaic" or "matrix" in the context of a securities law materiality analysis.
49 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980) . 50 Id. at 165 (footnote omitted).
51 Id. at 166. The court also stated that "a relevant question in determining materiality in a case of alleged tipping to analysts is whether the tipped information, if divulged to the public, would have been likely to affect the decision of potential buyers and sellers." Id. This may suggest, though the meaning of the statement is not entirely free from doubt, that "inconsequential" information may itself become material if it is the fact that completes a material mosaic, at least when the other facts are public. See infra note 60 and text accompanying notes 78-79, where this conclusion is further addressed.
information the analyst conveyed to clients after receiving this information was also not material.
53
The court affirmed the lower court's determination that the second revelation by the insider-a "grudging" affirmative response to an inquiry whether the recent quarter's earnings would be down-was material in and of itself, especially where the officer told the analyst that the information was confidential.
54
The actual rulings in Elkind did not apply any version of a mosaic theory either to exonerate or to condemn the disclosure of specific nonpublic information, because the first disclosure, as well as the conclusion reached by the analyst, was not material and the second disclosure was material standing alone.
In for the plaintiff because the tipped information itself appeared to be material wholly apart from any other information that was independently known to the recipient of the nonpublic information.
58
On remand in Fluor, the district court was faced with another defense motion for summary judgment, this time attempting to rebut anything supporting liability in a "laundry list"
of twenty-one items gleaned by an analyst from conversations with Fluor personnel that were alleged to support the claim of unlawful insider trading. 59 The court first stated that the mosaic approach, as it read Elkind, may result in a determination that some fact "seemingly insignificant" may be material if it "completes the mosaic, or 'the matrix'. . . ." 60 In other words, an immaterial fact that completes a matrix thereby becomes a material fact itself, so that the disclosure by the insider may become wrongful. The court did not address in detail what the speaker needs to know about the other elements of the mosaic in order to appreciate that his otherwise inconsequential disclosure, in the particular circumstance, is of a material fact. In 58 654 F.2d at 854. The court also disagreed with the district court that the substance of the information in question was already public. Id. In addition, on the issue of scienter the court stated that there was evidence that the speaker knew the tipped information was material, without any reference to whether he knew that the information would complete a material mosaic. Id. 60 Id. at 949. This is the court's complete statement:
Although the information may be seemingly insignificant and in some instances speculative, if it completes the mosaic, or "the matrix", and it is nonpublic, it may be material if "there [is] a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." assessing materiality in Fluor, the court noted that even if there was no market movement associated with the later public disclosure of discrete tipped items, it was necessary to consider whether an item "may or not be a coordinate in the 'matrix. '" 61 The court then addressed one by one, the allegedly material items that were disclosed, finding that some presented an issue for the jury on the question of materiality, some were not the basis for a claim because they were already public when they were discussed by Fluor with the analyst, and some were not material to the defendant's purchase of Fluor stock (e.g., because the information was unfavorable to Fluor). 62 In some cases the court held that the tipped information may have been material because, even though it was consistent with public estimates 61 566 F. Supp. at 949-50.
62 Id. at 949-54.
made by others, the fact that the company had made a similar estimate could be material. 63 In the end, the jury found for the defendants, and there was no further appeal.
64
Elkind did not present a robust application of a mosaic approach comparable to that expressed later by the SEC. 65 Fluor is more illuminating, but did not entail a direct application of the mosaic theory. This is essentially the end of the trail with respect to judicial decisions addressing materiality with express reference to a mosaic or matrix concept. Insiders often have special access to information about a transaction. Rumors or press reports about the transaction may be circulating but are difficult to evaluate because their source may be unknown. A trier of fact may find that information obtained from a particular insider, even if it mirrors rumors or press reports, is sufficiently more reliable, and, therefore, is material and nonpublic, because the insider tip alters the mix by confirming the rumor or reports. 1980) , to the effect that an analyst "'may piece seemingly inconsequential data together with public information into a mosaic' that the analyst is free to exploit" and arguing that an instruction prevented the jury from "distinguishing between trades caused by legal sources of information and those that were alleged to be the product of inside information"); Brief on Behalf of Appellee, at 68-70, No. 11-4416 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2012) (arguing in support of the contested jury instruction because it required only that the jury find that the material non-public information in some way informed the investment decision and that in any event any error was harmless in light of the "overwhelming" evidence of securities fraud).
In affirming Rajaratnam's conviction, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not address the mosaic theory. 719 F.3d 139, 160 (2d Cir. 2013) (upholding instruction that permitted the jury to convict if "material non-public information given to the defendant was a factor, however small, in the defendant's decision to purchase or sell stock"). One commentator characterized this ruling as "confirm[ation]" of the "death knell's sound on the mosaic defense. Michael M. Rosensaft, A Look Back at Insider Trading in 2013, SECURITIES LAW360 (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.law360.com/securities/articles/500198?nl_pk=356c60bb-0ccd-459d-af43-a2f24c364474&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=securities (on file with author). This is an overstatement of what the court of appeals held, as the court's analysis did not address any immaterial information garnered by the defendant and all of the material information was tipped to the defendant in breach of a duty owed by the tipper. 719 F.3d at 158. 75 Id. at 613. The SEC argued that the facts that (1) other persons, who apparently had no more information than the defendants, were asking the principal defendants if the company was for sale, and (2) there were rumors about a possible sale both factored into the defendants' decision to trade. Id. at 605, 611, 613, 616. The court does not explain how such rumors, when they did An insider using only internal company-generated information to reach a material conclusion bears no resemblance, from a legal analytical perspective, to the situation where an outsider obtains only an item or two of internal information that complete a picture when combined with information from external sources. some or all of which may be public. The parallel to the insider-outsider situation would be the insider giving a complete package of information to the outsider that the outsider uses, with nothing else, in deciding to trade. Thus, whatever one may think of the merits of Steffes in holding to account insiders who, without any tip from someone else within the company, assemble a mosaic of information from within, which they allegedly know to be nonpublic and confidential, Steffes fails to illuminate the law on when it is wrongful for an insider incidentally to provide an outsider with immaterial information that may, as it were, fill out the outsider's straight flush, especially where the insider does not know what cards the outsider already holds.
V. COMMENTATORS ON THE MOSAIC THEORY
The cases lack clarity in treating a mosaic; the views of commentators are also disparate in their understanding of a mosaic theory. In his treatise on insider trading, Professor Langevoort presents his conception of the law:
A case can arise where a person receives nonpublic information-for example, the planned introduction of a new product-that by itself would not be terribly important to the investment community generally. But because of the person's unique expertise and research, that information leads him to conclude that the company's earnings will increase substantially. In that case, he should not be precluded from trading, for though the information was material to him, it was not material to the "reasonable" investor in the marketplace. For this reason, investment analysts can properly elicit bits of information from company insiders and piece them together in a mosaic that can lead to an investment decision, so not emanate from persons in the know, can be deemed material information, or even part of a mosaic in this context. long as the pieces of information are not, standing alone, material. In that case, it is principally the skill of the analyst that leads to the profit, not simply his access to an insider. These "mosaic theory" cases pose some of the most difficult enforcement challenges in the law of insider trading. 79 This may identify when a disclosure is material; the next step is to assess whether the disclosure is wrongful. These authors comment that the Adopting Release "surprisingly 76 LANGEVOORT, supra note 5, § 5:3, at 5-18 to -19 (footnote omitted). This section of this treatise does not include any reference to the SEC's expression of the mosaic theory in the Adopting Release, supra text accompanying note 19, though it essentially restates the SEC's position.
77 Id. at § 11:5, at 11-18 (footnote omitted, including citation to the Adopting Release, supra note 15). In proposing new rules to clarify and expand the prohibition on insider trading, Professor Coffee also notes the difficulty of grappling with the mosaic concept. John C. Coffee, Jr. does not directly condemn disclosure of immaterial information, even if it provides the recipient of the disclosure with a material mosaic. 86 These authors decline to endorse a specific formulation of the mosaic theory in the insider trading context.
87
In a comprehensive article on insider trading, two practitioners stated that "an investor that assembles multiple pieces of [nonpublic] non-material information to reach a material conclusion has not violated insider trading laws." 88 These authors did not address whether it matters whether the tipper knows what the tippee already knows from other sources.
Another commentator expressed the most narrow interpretation of the reach of Rule 10b-5 in this context:
The phrase "unbeknownst to the issuer" (as stated in the adopting release) is a new addition to the mosaic theory and does not appear in Elkind. It is unclear and unlikely that an issuer's lack of awareness is a necessary condition of the mosaic theory. . . . [A]n officer of the issuer can knowingly convey an immaterial fact to an analyst.
89
Under this approach an insider of the issuer could lawfully convey information that is not material in and of itself, even if he knows that it will complete a significant mosaic for the analyst. 86 See supra text accompanying notes 49-54. Another author expressed a contrary view, that whether the insider knows that his disclosure completes a material mosaic does matter. It is "intentionally selective disclosure of material, nonpublic information" for an issuer to disclose "information [that] completes the mosaic and the issuer knows that providing such specific information to the analyst would influence an investment decision." 90 No authority was offered for this conclusion.
Another author interprets the SEC's mosaic theory-at least as a Regulation FD issue, whether or not also for purposes of Rule 10b-5-as entirely dependent upon whether the insider conveying the information knows that what he disclosed completed a material mosaic, in effect reading "even if" as used in the Adopting Release 91 to mean "only where":
When an issuer is unaware of either an analyst's research or the conclusions gleaned therefrom, the issuer may freely communicate nonmaterial information to the analyst in reliance of [sic] the "reasonable investor" standard. Nevertheless, a problem arises when an issuer becomes aware of the contents of an analyst's mosaic, which often contains information "not generally known" to the investing public. Under this scenario, the issuer may not communicate information the issuer knows will provide important missing pieces to the mosaic, regardless of whether the information, by itself, would satisfy the "reasonable investor" standard. Consequently, if an issuer knows that otherwise nonmaterial information will play a vital role in assisting the analyst to complete the mosaic, the issuer may not provide the information on a selective basis. Part IV showed that the caselaw lacks analytical rigor and clarity, if only because so much of it is dicta. The commentators also differ in their views, albeit many of the articles cited in this section are dated. The next section of this article presents a proposed statement of the legal principle that should apply and the practical effects of the rule.
VI. THE APPLICATION OF THE MOSAIC THEORY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF INSIDER TRADING
The following analysis addresses the situation where an insider discloses to an outsider information that is not material standing alone and the recipient of the information uses that information to complete a material mosaic, a picture that is not known to the public, and then trades in the securities of the issuer.
Consider this scenario. Company X, the only company of significance based in Remote City, California, has publicly announced that it hopes to employ some of its large horde of idle cash to make strategic acquisitions in the computer software industry. A securities analyst with a registered broker-dealer (Alex) is friends with the chief financial officer of Company Y (Bill), a publicly held software development company. They have made plans to play golf next weekend.
Bill calls
Alex, explaining that he must cancel their golf date, bemoaning that he has been called away to spend an uncertain period of time in "godforsaken" Remote City, California. Dirks in the Supreme Court provides that in analyzing whether an insider who discloses nonpublic information has breached a duty, the critical inquiry is whether the insider made the assessed at the time of the relevant materiality determination, e.g., when the trading occurred. Basic, 485 U.S. at 238. 94 For a case where the disclosure of travel plans was one factor in the analysis of misappropriated material information, see SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508, 521-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1998 ) (granting summary judgment for the SEC as to insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5, based in small part on disclosure of an executive's travel plans in connection with negotiation of an acquisition, where the defendant also had specific information from insiders about active work on a negotiation and the likely target).
95 A more complex, and perhaps more realistic, scenario in terms of analysts culling information from a variety of sources, would include the additional fact that the analyst had learned from a different source the (immaterial) fact that members of senior management of Company X have canceled long-standing vacation plans. This fact buttresses the conclusion-the probability component of the materiality assessment-that Company X is on the brink of some significant development, and, coupled with the information about Bill's plans, that that development is the acquisition of Company Y. 97 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 ("The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.") On the breadth of the gift concept in this context, see Coffee, supra note 77, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. at 292 & n. 24 ("any passage of [material nonpublic] information to a friend, after Obus, may be viewed by regulators as a 'gift' that satisfies the Dirks standard"). One author concludes that the benefit/gift concept has been so watered down that little may remain of the requirement.
In Obus, the Second Circuit found the benefit requirement could be satisfied based on evidence that the underwriter with the information and the hedge fund analyst with whom he spoke were "friends from college." . . . 99 This raises the question whether the tipper's reckless disregard of the public facts in this situation, and thus that the immaterial disclosure will complete the matrix, will satisfy the scienter requirement that the tipper knows that the information disclosed was material. Obus stated that one of the elements of tipping is that "the tipper must know that the information that is the subject of the tip is non-public and is material for securities trading purposes or act with reckless disregard of the nature of the information." 693 F.3d at 286. As discussed in the text, where the only other facts known to the tippee are public, then actual knowledge of the remaining components of the mosaic, or its functional equivalent, may be easy to demonstrate. As discussed later in this section, however, this element may be more difficult to establish where the tippee's mosaic includes other nonpublic information. See infra text accompanying note 104. clearer if the SEC had written "if unbeknownst to the issuer" or "only if unbeknownst to the issuer," but the statement is clear enough. The use of "even" in the phrase "even if, unbeknownst to the issuer" seems intended to provide emphasis that the issuer has not violated Regulation FD notwithstanding that the disclosure completes a mosaic, so long as the issuer does not know that it does. There is nothing in the Adopting Release that even implies that Regulation FD would not be triggered (and Rule 10b-5 arguably violated) if the speaker did know that the information he provided would complete a material mosaic. This parts company with one author whose analysis is quoted above. See supra text accompanying note 89.
upon his conscious appreciation of, or perhaps reckless failure to appreciate, the materiality of the information in question.
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If the analyst-tippee had only public information before learning something nonpublic from the insider, as in the hypothetical at the beginning of the section, the case against the tipper may be easy to make. For these purposes a senior officer should be presumed to know what information is public about both his company and the firm with which he is dealing directly.
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In any event, if need be it should be easy to prove that Bill actually knew the public information about Company X that is relevant to the impending transaction and thus to Alex's mosaic. It also
should not be too difficult to persuade the trier of fact that Bill would expect an astute analyst to be able to complete a material mosaic upon learning that he was going to Remote City. One who has a fiduciary duty of trust and confidence to shareholders (classical theory) or to a source of confidential information (misappropriation theory) and is in receipt of material non-public information has a duty to abstain from trading or to disclose the information publicly. The "abstain or disclose" rule was developed under the classical theory to prevent insiders from using their position of trust and confidence to gain a trading advantage over shareholders.
have known he was completing a mosaic. Timing is everything. Apart from other considerations, such as that the Managing Director did not reveal information to Moore for an improper purpose, this suggests why the SEC did not charge the Managing Director with tipping and instead charged Moore under the misappropriation theory for using information he obtained from CIBC in confidence.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This article establishes that an insider who discloses information that standing alone is nonpublic but not material does not violate Rule 10b-5 unless he knows, at that time, that the information he is conveying will complete a material mosaic of information for the recipient of the disclosure. If the tipper-insider does know, then he is vulnerable to a charge of unlawful tipping where the other elements, such as disclosing for an improper purpose, can be established.
How does this analysis guide an insider's communications with an outsider, the arguable tippee? One can, of course, choose never to say anything that is not already public. Even if the insider scrupulously follows the admonition to document contemporaneously what is said to any outsider, that will not be a sufficient prophylactic means to demonstrate the absence of a wrongful disclosure, because documenting an (otherwise) immaterial disclosure does not address what the speaker knew about what the tippee already knew. If that other information is public, it is, as noted, easy to prove the tipper knew it and there may even be a presumption that the speaker knew the tippee was aware of this information. 113 See, e.g., SEC v. Horn, No. 10-cv-955, 2010 WL 5370988, at * 4 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 16, 2010 ("Although it admits a lack of direct evidence, the SEC contends it can present enough circumstantial evidence to persuade a reasonable jury that [defendant] possessed nonpublic information. Direct evidence of insider trading is, indeed, rare; and the SEC is entitled to prove its case through circumstantial evidence."). See also Crimmins, supra note 97, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. at 363 ("Insider trading cases are virtually the only cases that the SEC frequently litigates based simply on circumstantial evidence."). See also supra note 104 (citing cases the SEC lost where its case was dependent on circumstantial evidence). 114 No claim should lie when the outsider obtains additional information, after the insider discloses immaterial information that turns out, in the end, to be crucial to completing the mosaic. In that event the insider cannot know that what he has provided will, only in the future, be crucial to completing a mosaic based on information not yet known to the outsider. See supra text accompanying notes 109-110 (analyzing this issue in a variant of Moore).
Similarly, the tippee will be liable if it is proven that he knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that the disclosure of the mosaic-completing information breached the tipper's duty to the source of the information. 115 Whether the tipper breached a duty is likely to depend in part on whether the tipper knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that his disclosure completed the tippee's mosaic. The tippee here will know whether the tipper knew what the tippee already knew where that information is entirely public or was provided by the tippee to the tipper. In this respect, two components of scienter, knowledge of materiality and knowing (or should have known) of the tippee's breach, are interrelated. 116 If, however, some of the tippee's information is nonpublic from other sources and the tippee himself did not tell the tipper what he, the tippee, already knew, the tippee would not, at the time, be able to assess whether the tipper knows that the inconsequential information the tipper is providing in fact is material because it completes the tippee's mosaic.
In the end, the advice to the insider must be more than "do not disclose material nonpublic information." It must also be "do not disclose immaterial nonpublic information, don't reveal anything that is relevant to the company or its securities that is not already public." 117 An insider cannot know with certainty what is already known to the person to whom he discloses nonpublic information 118 and someday he may have to prove that he did not know what the tippee knew. Likewise, the tippee is taking a big risk in acting on the tipper's information when the tippee cannot assess how much of his mosaic the tipper already knows.
The mosaic theory is not an illusion. The theory that underlies it is conceptually sound. It is, however, very much in doubt that a defendant-tipper can rely on it in defending a case under the classical theory of insider trading. Because the insider's ability to use the mosaic theory as a shield is in question, the supposed tippee, whose liability is derived from that of his tipper, is in a precarious position as well.
The only way to manage such risk would seem to be for the retail investor in possession of nonpublic information to simply refrain from trading on the information. This effectively forces the retail investor into what has been called a "parity-of-information" regime-a regime that prohibits trading on significant information unless it is broadly shared across the markets. The retail investor is then subject to a de facto restriction on trading on any particular development or piece of information, no matter how speculative or general in nature.
Crimmins, supra note 97, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. at 355-56. 118 One can of course ask what the other person knows. It is not clear if he lies and the insider believes him that the insider could thus rebut that he breached a duty in making disclosure. Plausible deniability may not carry the day here. Compare Heminway, supra note 9, 15 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. OF BUS. L. at 58 (questioning whether it is "right to allow [certain] securities trading firm principals . . . to avoid liability because they can plausibly deny the origins of material nonpublic information that underlies securities trading undertaken at their behest or for their financial benefit" by interposing other firm employees between them and sources of material nonpublic information).
